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Statement of Jurisdiction 
The district court entered judgment against Abisai Martinez-Castellanos 
for several offenses, including two counts of third-degree-felony possession. A 
copy of the judgment is attached. (Add. A.) This court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
Statement of the Issues 
Issue 1: Whether Martinez-Castellanos was denied the right to participate 
in the jury-selection process to his detriment; and relatedly, whether counsel was 
ineffective for failing to request that prospective jurors be dismissed for cause 
and/ or for failing to remove them with peremptory strikes. 
Issue 2: Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to make a motion to 
suppress evidence based on an unlawful extension of a traffic stop. 
Issue 3: Whether the district court erred in failing to ensure that Martinez-
Castellanos had the effective assistance of counsel at all stages of the 
proceedings, including during post-trial proceedings. 
Preservation: The issues were not preserved. Martinez-Castellanos has 
raised them under the plain-error and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrines. 
Standard of Review: For plain error, an appellant must show obvious 
error and prejudice. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1224 (Utah 1993). For ineffective 
assistance of counsel, an appellant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient and prejudicial. State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ifl8, 321 P.3d 1136. 
1 
Determinative Provisions 
The following provisions are attached at Add. B: U.S. CONST. amend. IV, 
VI, XIV; UTAH CONST. art. I,§§ 7, 12; Utah Code§ 77-1-6; Utah R. Crim. P. 17, 18. 
Statement of the Case 
1. Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition Below 
In June 2010, the State charged Martinez-Castellanos with two felony 
counts for possession of a controlled substance, one misdemeanor count for 
possession of a weapon, one misdemeanor count for possession of drug 
paraphernalia, and one misdemeanor count for driving with a measureable 
amount of drugs in the body.1 R.11-12. The case went to trial and the jury found 
Martinez-Castellanos guilty of the drug and paraphernalia offenses, but not 
guilty of the weapons offense. R.258-65. 
Approximately a week later, the district court filed a sua sponte notice that 
it was considering the possibility of granting a new trial because it was 
concerned that Martinez-Castellanos received ineffective assistance of counsel 
during the proceedings. R.268-69. While the court expressed concern based on 
"two events in the history of this case," the court ultimately appointed an 
attorney to present an amicus brief on one issue: whether defense counsel failed 
to file a memorandum "following an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion 
to suppress." R.268,274,279-86. After briefing, the court withdrew the sua sponte 
1 The State dismissed a charge for possession of a prescription drug. 
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notice and proceeded with sentencing. R.291-95. Martinez-Castellanos' counsel 
subsequently filed an unsupported Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict, and the court denied the motion. R.296-97,394. 
Martinez-Castellanos has timely appealed. He asserts that counsel was 
ineffective during jury selection and in failing to address the extended level-two 
detention; and the district court committed plain error when it failed to appoint 
counsel to represent Martinez-Castellanos in post-trial proceedings. 
2. Statement of Facts2 
The prosecution and defense each presented one witness to testify at trial: 
the State called Trooper John Sheets and the defense called Martinez-Castellanos. 
2.1 Trooper Sheets' Testimony 
Trooper Sheets testified that on June 9, 2010, after completing a traffic stop 
in the southbound lanes of traffic on 1-15 in Juab County, he saw an Acura 
traveling northbound-in the opposite direction. Compare R.440:41-42 with 
R.440:93-95. Although the trooper did not observe anything suspicious about the 
Acura, he crossed the interstate median with emergency lights engaged and 
accelerated to 110 mph to follow it. R.440:93-95. 
When Sheets caught up to the Acura, he observed two things: the car had 
California license plates and the rear plate had only one registration sticker. 
R.440:44. According to Sheets, California law requires drivers to display two 
2 The district court did not record some proceedings. R.450. Thus, the parties 
stipulated to supplement the record with declarations. R.407,409-432,493-95. 
3 
stickers on the license plate: one for the month and one for the year. Id. 
As the Acura pulled over, Sheets came to a stop behind it. He approached 
the passenger-side window and asked Martinez-Castellanos for a license and 
registration. R.440:45. Sheets testified that Martinez-Castellanos' speech and 
movements were rapid. R.440:56-57,99. He thought Martinez-Castellanos might 
be under the influence of "stimulants/' but he was not familiar with Martinez-
Castellanos; he did not know if this was his "normal way." R.436:8;440:56-57,99-
101 ("I don't know his personal traits" or "his personal speech").3 
Martinez-Castellanos gave Trooper Sheets insurance and registration 
information and an expired Colorado license. R.440:45. He told Sheets he had a 
valid Utah license but did not have it with him. Id. Sheets took the information to 
his patrol car and ran a driver's license, registration, and insurance check; and a 
check for warrants. R.440:48. He determined that everything was in order. He 
learned that Martinez-Castellanos had recently registered the car- in March 
2010-but did not properly affix a sticker to the plate. R.440:45A8,148. 
Sheets also ran a background check on Martinez-Castellanos for a criminal 
history. R.440:48-49. The dispatcher reported that Martinez-Castellanos had 
miscellaneous theft charges dating back to 1997; and charges for drug offenses in 
2001 and 2006. R.460:4. In addition, Sheets learned that three years earlier, in 
3 Sheets acknowledged that Martinez-Castellanos' behavior may be explained as 
nervousness. R.440:102. 
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2007, authorities rearrested Martinez-Castellanos and revoked his probation due 
to controlled substance possession. Id. The information "heightened" Trooper 
Sheets' suspicions "that [Martinez-Castellanos] might be [under] the influence of 
something." R.436:8. 
Sheets returned to Martinez-Castellanos and asked him to step out of the 
car for field-sobriety tests. R.440:57. He also asked about weapons. R.436:9-10. 
Martinez-Castellanos described a knife in the center console. Id. 
Sheets conducted field-sobriety tests, and Martinez-Castellanos "did fairly 
well." R.440:56-65,101 .4 Notwithstanding, Sheets believed Martinez-Castellanos 
was under the influence of controlled substances, and based on Martinez-
Castellanos' criminal history, Sheets believed he was a restricted person and was 
not supposed to be in possession of any weapons. R.440:65. Sheets placed 
Martinez-Castellanos under arrest in the patrol car and searched the Acura. Id. 
During the search, Sheets recovered either two pocket knives or a knife 
and a box cutter. R.440:66,143. He also recovered a lighter, a marijuana grinder, a 
4 Sheets administered several tests. First, he conducted the horizontal gaze 
nystagmus, which Martinez-Castellanos passed. R.440:57-59. Second, he 
conducted the convergence eye test. Martinez-Castellanos' s eyes came into the 
center for convergence and bounced "back out." R.440:59. Third, he administered 
the Rohmberg test for eyelid tremors and the "count in." R.440:60-61. According 
to Sheets, Martinez-Castellanos swayed "a little," his eyelids had some tremor, 
and he was off "a little bit" on the count. R.440:61. Fourth, he administered "the 
walk and tum." Id. Sheets testified that Martinez-Castellanos lost his balance "a 
little" on his "third step." R.440:62. The fifth test was the one-leg stand. Id. 
Martinez-Castellanos "didn't do too poorly on that." R.440:63. Sixth, Sheets took 
Martinez-Castellanos' pulse. It was 108 beats per minute, and according to 
Sheets, the faster rate may have been due to nervousness. R.440:64,102. 
5 
glass pipe, a wrapper with pills, and a "white crystal substance" that later tested 
positive for methamphetamine. R.436:18-19;440:65-84. The trooper transported 
Martinez-Castellanos to the jail and obtained a warrant for a blood draw. 
R.440:84-87. The crime lab prepared an analysis that showed positive for "THC 
metabolite" or marijuana. R.440:88-89. Sheets testified that a marijuana 
metabolite may remain in the system for 30 days after drug use. R.440:121. 
2.2 Martinez-Castellanos' Testimony 
On June 9, 2010, Martinez-Castellanos was driving northbound on I-15 
from California to attend his brother's graduation in Utah. R.411,427. Just before 
leaving, Martinez-Castellanos completed a 9 or 10-hour shift at work. R.411. He 
traveled all night, and had been on the road for twelve or more hours. Id. He 
drank energy drinks to stay awake. R.426,440:139. 
Martinez-Castellanos suffered from back problems. R.410; 440:132. He 
obtained a prescription in California for medical marijuana. R.440:133. His doctor 
told him to wait 6-8 hours after using marijuana before driving. R.440:134. 
Martinez-Castellanos admitted that he smoked marijuana a few days before 
leaving for Utah, and he thought he could drive because he had waited as 
directed. Id. Also, he admitted that the marijuana grinder and lighter in the car 
belonged to him; and the knife in the car's center console belonged to him. R.425-
26;440:137, 143-44. He denied knowing anything about other items in the Acura. 
R.410,425,440:143-44. 
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Martinez-Castellanos explained that he purchased the car from a 
dealership about a month before his trip and intended to give it to his brother for 
graduation. R.426-27. Apparently he was mistaken about when he had 
purchased the car: he purchased it three months earlier, in March 2010. 
R.440:142,148. Also, he paid $400 in cash for the car. R.426. The salesman told 
him the Acura was recently brought in and had not been cleaned. Id. In fact, the 
car was cluttered with trash. R.425-26. Martinez-Castellanos bought the car 
anyway, and registered it. R.426-27;440:9. He did not have time to clean it before 
his trip. Id. When Trooper Sheets stopped him on I-15, Martinez-Castellanos was 
surprised to learn he was missing a sticker on his license plate. R.460:3. 
3. Jury Selection 
The case went to trial, and the district court circulated juror questionnaires, 
which more than 20 people completed. R.440:2-4. Thereafter, in open court, the 
court asked the venire members preliminary background questions. R.431,440:4-
21. The court then invited counsel "to join [him] back in chambers" to address 
follow-up questions for venire members. R.440:21. Martinez-Castellanos was not 
invited to participate in that portion of the proceedings. Id.; R.416-17,431. 
While in chambers, the district court asked the attorneys if they had 
questions for anyone on the list of prospective jurors. R.416-17. If they did, the 
court called those prospective jurors into chambers for questioning. Id.; see also 
R.431. After questioning, the court generally asked each prospective juror ifs/he 
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could be fair and impartial. Id. The court then excused that individual, and 
typically asked whether the attorneys had concerns with that person serving on 
the jury and whether the attorneys passed the juror for cause. R.416,431. 
In all, the district court invited 13 individuals in chambers for questioning. 
R.412-16. At the conclusion of the process, the attorneys returned to the 
courtroom and exchanged the jury list to exercise peremptory strikes. R.412,428. 
Defense counsel exercised four strikes- against Jeffrey Bradley, Kert Stevens, 
Ryan Greenhalgh, and Gary Wood - although he could not recall why. R.428. 
Also, counsel did not recall having any conversation with Martinez-Ca~tellanos 
about the jury-selection process or involving him in the process. R.428,431. 
Before announcing the names of the eight individuals who would serve on 
the jury, the court asked the prosecution and defense whether the listed 
individuals "constitute[d] the jury [they each] selected." R.440:24. Both answered 
in the affirmative. Id. The court then announced the following individuals to 
serve on the jury: Paul Mangelson, Carolyn Sachra, Phil Sperry, Stacey Prevost, 
Rodney Steele, Lucy Jones, Chet Farr, and Mitchell Durbin. Id. 
For purposes of this appeal, the in-chambers voir dire proceedings relating 
to three of the impaneled jurors warrants further discussion. 
3.1 Paul Mangelson 
The prosecution and defense counsel were familiar with Mangelson. 
R.415,430. He served as a trooper in drug interdiction along 1-15 for several years 
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before he retired. See Myrna Trauntvein, Sgt. Paul Mangelson retires from the UHP 
after 40 years, NEPHI TIMES NEWS (Dec. 21, 2005), www.nephitimesnews.com/ 
1205/122105/2.htrn. He did not disclose that information in his questionnaire or 
during general questioning in the courtroom. See R.440:9;461 at 2 (answering 
"yes," without more, when asked about work in law enforcement). The court 
called him in chambers for questioning because of concerns about his experience 
in drug interdiction and his involvement in jury trials. Id. Mangelson disclosed 
that he knew Sheets; he assured the attorneys and court that he "could be fair" 
and "would make up his mind based on the facts"; and he stated he would "not 
give the officer's testimony any more weight" than the other witnesses. Id. 
After the in-chambers questioning, defense counsel did not strike 
Mangelson from the jury because, as a former prosecutor, defense counsel 
believed Mangelson would hear the evidence about the stop and "know that it 
was not proper." R.429. Mangelson ultimately served as foreman. R.440:205. 
3.2 Carolyn Sachra 
Carolyn Sachra revealed in chambers that she had been a victim of rape; 
she was against drugs; and "if a person had drugs in the car, they were probably 
guilty." R.415,428-29. No one objected to her service on the jury. Id. 
3.3 Lucy Jones 
Lucy Jones disclosed that she was either related to or close friends with the 
Nephi City Chief of Police. R.413. While in chambers, she "was quite reluctant to 
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disclose what was going on in her own mind." R.429. The court asked if she 
could be fair and impartial and she expressed "reservations about her ability to 
function as a juror." Id. The trial court asked her the same question a second 
time, and she replied that "she understood what the judge wanted" and 
"believed she could serve as a juror." Id. No one objected to her service. Id. 
4. Post-Trial Proceedings 
After the trial, the district court filed a sua sponte notice regarding a new 
trial. R.267-68. In addition, the court called the parties in chambers and expressed 
concern that Martinez-Castellanos may have received ineffective assistance at 
trial. R.268,422-23. The court initially identified two potential issues,5 but focused 
only on the extended traffic stop in light of the evidence presented at trial. R.268. 
The court stated that Sheets may have unlawfully "expanded the scope of the 
stop beyond what was permissible" by asking Martinez-Castellanos to step out 
of the car for field-sobriety tests. R.422. Based on the trial testimony, "there [was] 
at least an arguable basis to have pursued defendant's motion to suppress" and 
5 The district court also expressed concern that Martinez-Castellanos may have 
received ineffective assistance because defense counsel failed to challenge or 
remove Mangelson from the jury and failed to ask adequate follow-up questions. 
R.268,421,429-30. The court abandoned that issue, citing to State v. Smith, 2012 UT 
App 338, 291 P.3d 869. But that case is distinguishable. There, a juror answered 
"no" in the jury questionnaire when asked if she could weigh the evidence fairly 
and without prejudice and she referenced her teaching duties at the jail. Id. ,rs. 
During follow-up questioning,.she specified that she did not know whether 
teaching presented a conflict, and she gave answers supporting impartiality. Id. 
,r,r12-13. The court of appeals ruled the facts did not support a level of bias for 
challenging the juror: "To the contrary, [her] volunteer work at the jail" may 
have made her "favorably predisposed to the defense." Id. i!l3. 
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defense counsel "failed to do [so]." R.268. The court ruled it would appoint 
conflict counsel to represent Martinez-Castellanos in the post-trial proceedings, 
but then appointed Tate Bennett to file an amicus brief. R.274,279-86. 
Bennett did not address the extended detention or the evidence. R.279-86. 
Instead, he filed a memorandum identifying the two-part analysis for ineffective 
assistance of counsel and the burdens of the parties in briefing suppression 
issues. Id. Bennett believed the district court's earlier denial of the motion to 
suppress was sufficient to include" an implicit determination that the facts 
elicited at the evidentiary hearing" supported a lawful search, R.279, even 
though the earlier ruling was made without the benefit of argument from the 
defense and did not address the trial evidence or the lawfulness of the extended 
detention, and did not include findings. R.57,268. The prosecution agreed with 
the statements in the amicus brief. R.291. Thereafter, without allowing Martinez-
Castellanos an opportunity to respond to the issues with the assistance of conflict 
counsel, the court withdrew its sua sponte notice. Id. 
After sentencing, trial counsel filed a motion asking the court to suppress 
the evidence based on the "concern that was expressed by the Court in its 
Memorandums and the fact that all of the evidence upon which reliance is made 
was not fully developed until the time of the trial." R.296-97. Counsel did not 
elaborate or support the motion with legal argument. Instead, he attached to the 
motion several transcript pages and referenced "a substantial change [in] the 
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officer's testimony regarding the reason for the stop and the time and delay in 
the stop." R.296. The State opposed the motion as untimely and inadequate, and 
the district court denied it. R.382-94. Martinez-Castellanos appealed. R.395-96. 
Summary of the Argument 
This court should reverse Martinez-Castellanos' convictions for three 
reasons. First, Martinez-Castellanos was denied the opportunity to participate in 
jury selection and was denied the right to an impartial jury. Under the state and 
federal constitutions and the rules of crirnrnal procedure, a defendant has a right 
to be present at every stage of trial and to be tried by an impartial jury. Martinez-
Castellanos was deprived of those rights when his attorney failed to object to the 
district court's order excluding him from participating in jury voir dire in-
chambers. Counsel's conduct constituted ineffective assistance. Martinez-
Castellanos was not allowed to participate in a critical stage of his trial, to learn 
about the individuals who would decide his fate, and to learn that three jurors 
expressed experiences and biases affecting their perceptions and abilities to serve 
as jurors in this felony case. 
Second, Martinez-Castellanos was deprived of the effective assistance of 
counsel when counsel failed to file a proper motion to suppress evidence seized 
during an unlawfully extended traffic stop. Indeed, defense counsel failed to 
address the issue or to file a memorandum supporting a motion to suppress the 
evidence even when the district court brought the matter to defense counsel's 
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attention. Counsel's deficient performance resulted in prejudice because there is 
a reasonable likelihood that the district court would have given the issue proper 
consideration in Martinez-Castellanos' favor if counsel had presented the 
arguments. The case should be remanded for further proceedings on this issue. 
Third, the district court committed plain error when it failed to appoint 
post-trial conflict counsel to assess whether Martinez-Castellanos received 
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution guarantees the defendant the right to the effective assistance 
of counsel at all stages of the criminal proceedings. After the trial, the district 
court expressed concerns about the extended detention, and defense counsel's 
failure to develop the issue for the court. The court ruled it would appoint 
conflict counsel to address the matter. But then, instead of appointing conflict 
counsel, the court appointed amicus counsel to present arguments to the court. 
Amicus counsel did not represent Martinez-Castellanos and made no effort to 
address the extended detention issues. Instead, amicus counsel advised the court 
that defense counsel was not ineffective. Had the district court appointed 
conflict counsel to analyze the issues there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
district court would have given proper consideration to meritorious arguments 
to suppress the evidence in this case; and it would have made findings in favor 
of Martinez-Castellanos. 
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Argument 
Martinez-Castellanos has addressed three issues. He asks this court to 
reverse the convictions and to remand the case for further proceedings based on 
the following: first, Martinez-Castellanos was denied the right to participate in 
jury selection and was denied the right to an impartial jury; second, Trooper 
Sheets unlawfully extended the traffic stop to engage in a criminal investigation 
and to search Martinez-Castellanos' car; and third, the district court erred 
when-after recognizing that Martinez-Castellanos may have been denied the 
effective assistance of counsel during trial- it failed to appoint new counsel to 
represent him in post-trial proceedings. Martinez-Castellanos has raised each 
issue under the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel or plain-error doctrine. 
1. A criminal defendant is entitled to participate in jury selection and to an 
impartial jury 
A defendant has a fundamental right to be present at every stage of trial. 
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337,338 (1970). This right derives from the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. U.S. v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522,526 (1985) (per curiam); 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404-08 (1965); U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV; see 
also UTAH CONST. art. I,§§ 7,12. It also derives from Utah statutory law. Utah 
Code§ 77-1-6(1)(a) (defendant is entitled to appear in person); see also State v. 
Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987,989 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (accused "has the right to appear 
and defend in person at all stages of trial"). A defendant likewise has the right to 
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a trial by an impartial jury. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV; UTAH CONST. art. I, 
§§ 7,12; Utah Code§ 77-1-6(1)(£). 
The United States Supreme Court in Gomez v. United States affirmed that 
jury selection and voir dire are critical stages of the trial: "the trial commences at 
least from the time when the work of empanelling the jury begins." 490 U.S. 858, 
873 (1989). Indeed, those early stages of the trial are the "primary means by 
which a court may enforce a defendant's right to be tried by a jury free from 
ethnic, racial, or political prejudice." Id. 
As early as 1884, the Supreme Court relied on constitutional provisions 
and Utah law to rule that a defendant has the right to be personally present at 
trial, and that right extends to being present when the court and counsel question 
venire members about potential bias. Hopt v. Utah Territory, 110 U.S. 574,578 
(1884). The Hopt Court reiterated that the accused's "life or liberty may depend 
upon the aid which, by his personal presence, he may give to counsel and to the 
court and triers, in the selection of jurors. The necessities of the defense may not 
be met by the presence of his counsel only." Id. 6 The Court relied in part on the 
Utah rules for its holding. The rules in effect then - and now - expressly entitle 
the defendant to be "personally present at the trial" in a felony case. Id. at 576.7 
6 The Court held that if a defendant is deprived of "his life or liberty without 
being so present, such deprivation would be without that due process of law 
required by the constitution." Hopt, 110 U.S. at 579. 
7 In Snyder v. Massachusetts, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the 
defendant's presence at trial is a "condition of due process to the extent that a 
fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence." 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 
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Specifically, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 states that in all cases, 
"the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel," and the defendant "shall be personally present at the trial." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 17(a). The "trial" includes impaneling a jury. Id. at 17(g). 
Rule 18 also supports the defendant's right to be present during voir dire 
proceedings. It states that the court "may permit counsel or the defendant to 
conduct the examination of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the 
examination." Id. at 18(b). Rules 17 and 18 together confirm that jury selection is 
part of trial and the defendant is entitled to be present. State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 
45, if33, 48 P.3d 953; State v. Glenny, 656 P.2d 990,992 (Utah 1982). 
In this case, Martinez-Castellanos was not allowed to participate in 
portions of the voir dire proceedings and, as a result, he did not learn about the 
biases of individuals who were impaneled to serve on the jury. In fact, the 
district court excluded Martinez-Castellanos from the jury voir dire, and defense 
counsel failed to object. R.428,440:21. Under the circumstances, Martinez-
Castellanos' rights were violated as follows: First, Martinez-Castellanos was 
(1934). The Court has also reiterated that due process ensures the defendant's 
right to be present at every stage of trial. See e.g. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 
745 (1987) (" a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the 
criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would 
contribute to the fairness of the procedure"); Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526; Allen, 397 
U.S. at 338. Moreover, courts have recognized the defendant's right to be present 
at every stage of the trial, including jury voir dire. See U.S. v. Alikpo, 944 F.2d 206, 
207 (5th Cir. 1991); State v. Carver, 496 P.2d 676, 678-79, 681 (Idaho 1972); State v. 
Bird, 43 P.3d 266, 269-73 (Mont. 2002); State v. Irby, 246 P.3d 796, 799-803 (Wash. 
2011) (en bane). 
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denied the right to participate in voir dire and jury-selection proceedings and 
thereby denied the opportunity to be present at a critical stage of the trial. 
Second, because Martinez-Castellanos' counsel failed to object when the district 
court excluded him from the process, counsel provided ineffective assistance and 
allowed biased individuals to serve on the jury. 
1.1 Mr. Martinez-Castellanos was denied the right to participate in 
voir dire and jury-selection proceedings 
The district court and defense counsel violated Martinez-Castellanos' right 
to participate in jury selection. Martinez-Castellanos was not allowed to attend or 
to participate in voir dire proceedings when attorneys asked individual venire 
members about their experiences, biases, hostilities, or predispositions. R.440:21. 
Moreover, Martinez-Castellanos did not waive his right to participate in those 
proceedings and the court did not articulate good cause for excluding him. 
Courts have ruled that to waive the constitutional right to be present at 
jury selection, the defendant must be informed of the right and mus.t specifically, 
voluntarily, and knowingly waive it on the record. See Carver, 496 P.2d at 678-79, 
681; Bird, 43 P.3d at 269-73; see also Wagstaff, 772 P.2d at 989-90 (a waiver of the 
defendant's right to be present at trial must be "voluntary and involve an 
intentional relinquishment of a known right"). "To intentionally relinquish the 
right to be present, the defendant must have notice of the proceedings," and the 
defendant's absence must be voluntary in the sense that "he is free to attend." 
State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996). 
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Likewise, under the Utah rules, a defendant may waive his right to 
participate in jury-selection proceedings if he is voluntarily absent after receiving 
"notice" of the proceedings; or if the court orders his absence "for good cause 
shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct." Id. at 
17(a); see Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, if34 (defendant waived right to be present for 
sidebar voir dire when he failed to assert the right; no plain error); Wagstaff, 772 
P.2d at 989-90 (defendant intentionally left the state, waiving right to be present). 
In this case, the district court conducted jury-selection proceedings in 
Martinez-Castellanos' absence but without a waiver and without finding good 
cause to do so. Specifically, after the court asked venire members preliminary 
and general background questions in open court,8 it announced that it would 
continue the proceedings in chambers. R.440:6-21. The court stated: 
Counsel, that concludes the voir dire that I'm going to conduct in 
court. For members of the prospective jury, I'm going to take a break 
now and meet with counsel in my chambers, and they will 
determine any additional questions that they'd like to ask. They may 
ask questions of each of you or only some of you. You' re free to 
walk about, stretch your legs. Stay in the courtroom, because we 
may be calling you .... I will be in a brief recess until we come back 
8 The district court obtained information from venire members through 
questionnaires and examination in open court before moving the proceedings in 
chambers. The questionnaires asked prospective jurors about their employment, 
education, general interests, and family. R.461. In open court, the district court 
asked prospective jurors to repeat some of that same information. R.440:16-21. 
The court then asked venire members to raise their hands if they had close 
associations with law enforcement, a victim of crime, or someone with an 
experience similar to the conduct described in the information; and to raise their 
hands if they had their own experiences with crime or had previously served on 
a jury. Id. Although several individuals raised their hands, the court did not ask 
them to disclose information at that time. R.440:17. 
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in, which may be in a few minutes. Counsel, if you'll just join me 
back in my chambers, I'd appreciate it. 
Id. The court and attorneys then retired to the judge's chambers and the court 
invited prospective jurors to join them for questioning. During the in-chambers 
proceedings, the attorneys asked venire members questions about their 
experiences, biases, and abilities to serve on the jury. R.428-31,412-16. 
Martinez-Castellanos was not invited to participate in the in-cha1nbers 
proceedings. He had no notice of his right to attend, and no opportunity to 
choose between attending the in-chambers proceedings or voluntarily 
relinquishing his right to be present. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. Also, while the 
district court excluded Martinez-Castellanos from the proceedings, its order was 
not based on" good cause shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or 
obstreperous conduct." Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a). 
In addition, defense counsel made no effort to protect Martinez-
Castellanos' rights to participate. Counsel did not notify Martinez-Castellanos of 
his rights, did not obtain a waiver, did not object to proceeding in chambers in 
Martinez-Castellanos' absence, did not recall any conversation with Martinez-
Castellanos "about any part of the jury selection process," and did not involve 
Martinez-Castellanos in the process. R.428. Thus, Martinez-Castellanos had no 
opportunity to understand the proceedings or participate in jury voir dire and 
selection. R.428,431,440:21. 
During the in-chambers proceedings, prospective jurors revealed 
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important information. Specifically, Juror Mangelson discussed his years of 
experience as a highway patrolman and his assignments relating to drug 
interdiction on I-15. R.415. In addition, Mangelson disclosed that he knew the 
State's sole witness, Trooper Sheets. Id. Notably, Mangelson failed to make these 
basic disclosures in the questionnaire or during voir dire in the courtroom. See 
R.461 at 2; see also R.440:9,15-18. Consequently, Martinez-Castellanos had no 
opportunity to learn about Mangelson's experiences. R.440:16-18. 
Next, Juror Jones disclosed that she was acquainted with someone in law 
enforcement. R.413. When the court asked during the in-chambers proceedings 
whether she could be fair and impartial, she expressed reservations. R.429. When 
the court asked the question a second time, she replied that "she understood 
what the judge wanted and she believed she could serve as a juror." Id. 
Also, Juror Sachra disclosed that her son had been prosecuted for drugs, 
she was "against drugs," and she believed that if a person had drugs in the car, 
he was probably guilty. R.415. 
The record suggests the district court may have made efforts to rehabilitate 
some prospective jurors. R.412-16,428-31. But the record does not support that 
these particular jurors were rehabilitated and the law does not support their 
rehabilitation. See State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, il36, 992 P.2d 951 (" a juror's 
statement alone that he or she can decide a case fairly ... is not a sufficient basis 
for qualifying a juror to sit when the prospective juror's answers provide 
20 
' 
, 
evidence of possible bias"). In fact, defense counsel did not address issues of bias 
or move to strike or remove prospective jurors expressing bias from the panel. 
R.428-31. Instead, counsel "passed" the panel and then used peremptory strikes 
to remove Bradley, Stevens, Greenhalgh, and Wood for reasons unknown even 
to him.9 R.428. As a result, the court empaneled Jurors Mangelson, Jones, and 
Sachra to serve on the jury. R.440:24. 
1.2 Martinez-Castellanos' defense counsel provided ineffective 
assistance and allowed biased individuals to serve on the jury 
Ultimately, defense counsel was responsible for objecting to voir dire and 
jury-selection proceedings in Martinez-Castellanos' absence or for requesting 
that the district court obtain a proper waiver from Martinez-Castellanos. Counsel 
owed a duty of loyalty to Martinez-Castellanos. "Critical to the attorney-client 
relationship and the integrity of judicial proceedings is an attorney's duty to 
represent the interests of a client with zeal and loyalty. The duty of loyalty is so 
essential to the proper functioning of the judicial system that its faithful 
discharge is mandated not only by the Rules of Professional Conduct, but also, in 
criminal cases, by the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to the 
9 Counsel recalled exercising peremptory strikes against those individuals but 
could not recall why. R.428. A review of their questionnaires and courtroom voir 
dire yields little information. R.461 at 1,6,9,14. While Greenhalgh answered yes to 
a question in the form about whether he or a family member had been a victim of 
crime, he did not explain. R.461 at 9. Likewise, Stevens and Bradley answered 
yes to whether they or a family member had been criminally charged, but neither 
Stevens nor Bradley explained. R.416,461 at 1,6. 
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effective assistance of counsel." State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357,359 (Utah 1994). As 
the Utah Supreme Court stated, "defendants are wholly dependent on the 
dedication of their attorneys to protect their interests and to ensure their fair 
treatment under the law." Id. 
Because counsel failed to take measures to protect Martinez-Castellanos' 
rights, he provided ineffective assistance. Under the ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel doctrine, Martinez-Castellanos must satisfy a two-part analysis. He must 
demonstrate that counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, and he must demonstrate prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687, 691-93 (1984). Martinez-Castellanos has made the showing here. 
First, he has demonstrated that counsel's failure to involve him in jury-selection 
proceedings constituted deficient performance; second, counsel's conduct fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness because counsel allowed jurors, 
who had expressed reservations and bias, to serve on the jury without consulting 
Martinez-Castellanos; and third, Martinez-Castellanos was prejudiced by 
counsel's deficient performance. 
1.2.1 Under the Strickland analysis, defense counsel's failure to 
involve Martinez-Castellanos in voir dire proceedings 
constituted deficient performance 
In establishing deficient performance under the first part of the Strickland 
analysis, a defendant is required to "rebut the strong presumption that under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." 
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State v. Carter, 2001 UT 96, ,I40, 44 P.3d 626 (quotations omitted). That strong 
presumption is rebutted in this case for several independent reasons. 
First, the presumption in favor of counsel is rebutted based on a 
defendant's constitutional right to participate in the proceedings and the plain 
language of rule 17(a). As stated above, absent the defendant's voluntary waiver, 
the constitution guarantees a defendant's right to be present at trial. Carver, 496 
P.2d at 678-79, 681; Bird, 43 P.3d at 269-73; see U.S. v. Gordon, 829 F.2d 119, 125 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) ("the court should have held an on-the-record hearing to advise 
[the defendant] of his right to be present at voir dire and obtain[] a personal 
waiver") Also, the rules expressly recognize the defendant's right to participate 
in jury voir dire and selection unless the defendant "voluntar[ily]" absents 
himself after notice of the proceedings. Utah R. Crim. P. 17 & 18; supra Arg. 1.1. 
The dictionary and Utah courts define the term "voluntary" to mean 
"having power of free choice," choosing by design, and intentional conduct. See 
www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary /voluntary; Wagstaff, 772 P.2d at 990. 
The courts recognize that "notice" must be sufficient to advise the defendant that 
he is "free to attend." Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. Thus, the constitutional 
guarantee and the rules require more than mere absence and silence to constitute 
a voluntary waiver based on "notice." See supra Arg. 1.1. Indeed, if the events 
here were sufficient to support notice and voluntary waiver, the constitutional 
right and the rule would be meaningless. See Bird, 43 P.3d at 269-72. 
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Given the defendant's constitutional right to be present and the plain 
language of rule 17, counsel's failure to object to the court's decision to engage in 
voir dire and jury-selection proceedings outside Martinez-Castellanos' presence 
and without consulting with Martinez-Castellanos did not support waiver, but 
rather supported inadvertence or neglect, R.428, thereby rebutting any 
presumption that counsel's conduct might be considered sound trial strategy. See 
Commonwealth v. Shablin, 524 A.2d 511,513 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (concluding that 
if defendant's waiver of right to jury trial was not voluntary, then attorney 
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel). 
Second, the strong presumption in favor of "sound trial strategy" is 
rebutted because counsel admitted he failed to involve Martinez-Castellanos in 
the process. R.428. While "[c]lose consultation between attorney and client is 
essential to the informed exercise of challenges to prospective jurors," Norde v. 
Keane, 294 F.3d 401,414 (2d Cir. 2002), counsel did not assess whether defendant 
intended to absent himself from the in-chambers voir dire and selection 
proceedings. R.428. Consequently, he was not in a position to make reasonable 
strategic decisions. See State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990) (if counsel 
fails to investigate, a decision cannot be considered tactical). 
Third, a reasonable lawyer knows that a defendant has the right to be 
present when the court and lawyers question those who will decide the case. 
State v. Berosik, 214 P.3d 776, 781-82 (Mont. 2009). The defendant has a right to 
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learn whether prospective jurors have been victims of crime, have law-
enforcement associations, and can be fair and impartial. People v. Marzug, 270 
A.2d 945, 945 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). 
Likewise, a reasonable lawyer knows that "he should have as much 
information about the backgrounds of the jurors as possible, so that he can 
interrelate this data with his client's history. He must make important 
assessments based on that information as to whether selection of a given juror 
will be of advantage to his client." State v. Garcia, 620 P.2d 1271, 1274 (N.M. 1980). 
A reasonable lawyer will consult his client as to whether or not the jurors 
examined are satisfactory; and during the course of the voir dire, the client may 
notice something that would suggest a juror is prejudiced against him. "[T]he 
rationale behind requiring the defendant's presence during [jury selection] is to 
ensure that defendant has knowledge of proceedings and is always readily 
available to counsel for input into critical decisions affecting the case." Hardy v. 
State, 696 So.2d 1227, 1227 (Fl. Ct. App. 1997). 
Because defense counsel here failed to involve Martinez-Castellanos in the 
jury-selection process, he violated the duty of loyalty and denied Martinez-
Castellanos the opportunity to learn that Juror Mangelson had an extensive law-
enforcement background, Juror Jones had reservations about her ability to be 
impartial, and Juror Sachra had a bias against anyone found with drugs in the 
car. Supra, pp. 7-10. The record here fails to support that defense counsel acted as 
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a reasonable lawyer. Indeed, counsel's inactions failed to protect Martinez-
Castellanos' constitutional rights and his rights under Rule 17. Martinez-
Castellanos has satisfied the first prong of the Strickland analysis. 
1.2.2 Defense counsel's conduct fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness when he allowed jurors, who 
expressed reservations and bias, to serve on the jury 
The record supports that counsel's performance was deficient in another 
independent but related way: because counsel failed to involve Martinez-
Castellanos in the jury-selection process, he failed to give Martinez-Castellanos 
the opportunity to consult about the very individuals who would decide his fate 
and to learn about the empaneled jurors' experiences and biases. Indeed, counsel 
was indifferent and inattentive to the make-up of the jury; he allowed biased 
venire members and a longtime sergeant of the Utah Highway Patrol to serve on 
the jury without consulting Martinez-Castellanos. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that counsel's decisions about 
empaneling jurors are presumed to be "reasonable" and the product of a 
"conscious choice or preference." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,r20, 12 P.3d 92 
(emphasis added). Also, "because the process of jury selection is a highly 
subjective, judgmental, and intuitive process," counsel's decision not to remove a 
juror is "presumed to constitute effective representation." Id.; see also id. ,r21 
(these presumptions are appropriate "because jury selection is more art than 
science"). For this reason, "it follows that the decision not to remove a particular 
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juror need only be plausibly justifiable, and such plausible justifiability is 
ordinarily presumed. In other words, the appellate court will presume that 
counsel's lack of objection to, or failure to remove, a particular juror was the 
result of a plausibly justifiable conscious choice or preference." Id. if25; see also 
State v. Hunt, 2014 UT App 109, if if7-8, 327 P.3d 37. 
In Taylor v. State, the court held that the presumption set forth in Litherland 
is rebuttable. 2007 UT 12, if 75, 156 P.3d 739. A defendant may rebut the 
presumption that counsel made a reasonably effective, conscious, and strategic 
choice by showing one of the following circumstances: 
(1) that defense counsel was so inattentive or indifferent during the 
jury selection process that the failure to remove a prospective juror 
was not the product of a conscious choice or preference; (2) that a 
prospective juror expressed bias so strong or unequivocal that no 
plausibly countervailing subjective preference could justify failure to 
remove that juror; or (3) that there is some other specific evidence 
clearly demonstrating that counsel's choice was not plausibly 
justifiable. 
Id. Although Martinez-Castellanos' appeal focuses on his right to be involved in 
the jury-selection process, he is able to rebut the Litherland/Taylor presumptions 
under all three circumstances. Indeed, Martinez-Castellanos has relied on the 
Litherland/Taylor standard to demonstrate that, in addition to failing to ensure 
that Martinez-Castellanos was allowed to participate in jury selection (supra, Arg. 
1.2.1), counsel was inattentive and indifferent in exercising peremptory strikes. 
In that regard, Martinez-Castellanos first addresses rule 18, and second he 
addresses the Litherland/Taylor standard in the context of the jury in this case. 
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1.2.2.1 Rule 18 
The state and federal constitutions entitle a defendant to the right to be 
tried by an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. V, VI, XIV; Utah Const. art. I,§§ 7, 
12. To facilitate a defendant's right to an impartial jury, the Utah Supreme Court 
has promulgated Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18. The rule allows the district 
court to remove a prospective juror "for cause" for several reasons including the 
following: the existence of a relationship between a prospective juror and a 
witness, when that relationship, "when viewed objectively, would suggest to 
reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to 
return a verdict which would be free of favoritism"; the prospective juror has 
revealed that she "[has] formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as 
to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged"; or the 
prospective juror has revealed "[c]onduct, responses, state of mind or other 
circumstances that reasonably lead the court to conclude the juror is not likely to 
act impartially." Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(4), (13) & (14). 
In West v. Holley, the Utah Supreme Court held that under the rules, voir 
dire responses that evidence bias" give rise to a presumption that the potential 
juror is biased, and the juror must be dismissed unless that presumption is 
rebutted." 2004 UT 97, ,Il4, 103 P.3d 708. If a prospective juror makes a statement 
that "facially raise[s] a question of partiality or prejudice," the juror must be 
removed by the court "unless the court or counsel investigates further and finds 
the inference rebutted." Id. While the inference of bias may be rebutted if the 
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prospective juror's statement was "merely the product of a light impression," id. 
,r15, a bare assertion or a conclusory statement that the juror "will not be affected 
by a particular attitude or will decide the case fairly is not sufficient." Saunders, 
1999 UT 59, ,r36. Such a statement may be treated with suspicion if the 
prospective juror has made a direct statement of bias. State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, 
,r,r32-33, 24 P.3d 948. The supreme court likewise has cautioned that" strong and 
deep impressions which will close the mind against the testimony that may be 
offered in opposition to them[,] which will combat that testimony and resist its 
force, do constitute a sufficient objection to [a juror]." State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 
1061, 1064-65 (Utah 1989). 
The supreme court has encouraged district courts to be liberal in removing 
prospective jurors from the panel for cause. In Saunders, the court emphasized 
the ease with which issues of bias "can be dispensed by the simple expedient of 
replacing a questionable juror with another whose neutrality is not open to 
question." 1999 UT 59, ,r51. A district court should view it as a "simple matter to 
obviate any problem of bias simply by excusing the prospective juror and 
selecting another." Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533,536 (Utah 1981), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994). 
1.2.2.2 The Litherland/Taylor Analysis 
Based on the above doctrines, and under the Litherland/Taylor analysis, 
counsel failed to make reasonable conscious and strategic choices when he failed 
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to object to or to remove Mangelson, Jones, and Sachra from the jury panel. 
First, counsel provided ineffective assistance under Litherland and Taylor 
because he was so inattentive or indifferent during jury selection that the failure 
to remove jurors was not the product of a conscious choice or preference. "To 
establish that trial counsel was inattentive, Defendant must show either' a 
specific or clear example of inattentiveness that directly caused the failure to 
object to a particular juror, or else show that counsel generally failed to 
participate in a meaningful way in the process as a whole."' State v. Alfatlawi, 
2006 UT App 511, ifl9, 153 P.3d 804. 
A specific example of inattentiveness or indifference involves Juror Sachra. 
Counsel was inattentive when she expressed bias. Ms. Sachra "formed or 
expressed an unqualified opinion or belief" that if a person has drugs in the car, 
he is probably guilty. Utah R. Crim. P. 18; R.415. The prosecution remembered 
those comments, while defense counsel was inattentive to them. Compare R.415 
with R.430. Indeed, defense counsel took no action that would suggest he was 
attentive to a prospective juror who expressed a strong belief before hearing the 
evidence. Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(13); Wach, 2001 UT 35, ,rip2-34. 
Likewise, counsel was indifferent to Ms. Jones' reservations about her 
ability to be fair and impartial. After expressing such reservations, the court 
asked her again about her ability to function as a juror, and she "replied that she 
understood what the judge wanted and she believed she could serve as a juror." 
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R.429. Under Utah law, that answer did not resolve the issue. The Utah Supreme 
Court has cautioned against seating a juror if she has expressed reservations 
about her ability to serve on the jury and is then pressed by the district court to 
give a statement for rehabilitation purposes. Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(13); Wach, 
2001 UT 35, if if33-35. Moreover, a bare assertion suggesting rehabilitation "is not 
sufficient." Saunders, 1999 UT 59, if 36. Counsel was either indifferent to the law 
or ignorant of it: counsel failed to request further inquiry, failed to make a 
motion to remove Ms. Jones, and failed to remove her with a peremptory strike. 
Second, counsel provided ineffective assistance under Litherland and Taylor 
because the record supports that Ms. Sachra expressed the sort of strong, 
unequivocal bias that would cause a reasonable person to second guess counsel's 
actions in failing to remove her from the panel. Ms. Sachra stated unequivocally 
that she was against drugs and that if a person had drugs in the car, he was 
probably guilty. R.415. In the face of those statements, counsel did nothing. 
Moreover, no plausible countervailing subjective preference could justify 
counsel's failure to remove Ms. Sachra from the panel, and counsel identified no 
such preference for Ms. Sachra here. In fact, defense counsel had no recollection 
of why Ms. Sachra was allowed to remain and serve on the jury. R.428-29. 
Third, counsel provided ineffective assistance under Litherland and Taylor 
because the record supports that defense counsel's choice in not objecting to 
jurors was implausible and unjustifiable. Specifically, as already stated, defense 
31 
counsel had no justification for keeping Ms. Sachra and Ms. Jones on the jury 
after they made their disclosures. In addition, counsel had no plausible or 
justifiable reason for keeping Sgt. Mangelson on the jury. Counsel revealed that 
he kept Mangelson on the jury-notwithstanding his years of service as a 
patrolman on I-15, working on cases identical to Martinez-Castellanos' case-
because he had an association with Mangelson when he was a prosecutor, and he 
thought Mangelson would hear evidence about the traffic stop and know it was 
improper. R.429-30. Counsel's reasons were implausible because under Utah law, 
the propriety of the traffic stop was not for the jury to decide; it was for the 
district court to decide. Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c)(l)(B), 12(d), 12(e) (a defendant 
must raise a motion to suppress to the court before trial). Moreover, counsel did 
not ask the jury to find that the traffic stop was improper. R.440:184-96. Based on 
the record, defense counsel's reasons for failing to strike the jurors were 
implausible and unjustifiable, and they were illogical under the law and 
unsupported by counsel's own arguments to the jury. 
Counsel's action and inactions constituted ineffective assistance because 
Martinez-Castellanos had no opportunity to learn important facts about 
prospective jurors, to give input into the process, and to participate. See R.428. 
Consultation with counsel would have been II essential to the informed exercise 
of challenges to prospective jurors." Norde, 294 F.3d at 414. Yet, Martinez-
Castellanos was II unable to consult with his counsel," and counsel failed to 
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advise him" during the course of the examination of those who would decide his 
fate." Id. Because counsel failed to involve Martinez-Castellanos in the process, 
he was deprived of the right to be present during a critical stage of the trial. Utah 
R. Crim. P. 17(a),18(b); Utah Code§ 77-1-6(1)(f); see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, 
VI, XIV; UTAH CONST. art. I,§§ 7,12. 
1.2.3 Under the Strickland analysis, Martinez-Castellanos was 
prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance 
Courts have applied different tests to assess prejudice when the defendant 
has been deprived of the opportunity to participate in jury voir dire. In Hopt, the 
Court considered the error to be "irregular" and to warrant the entry of an order 
to vitiate all "subsequent proceedings," even though the defense did not raise the 
issue in the trial court. 110 U.S. at 577-79; see Bird, 43 P.3d at 272 (error was 
"structural"); People v. Williams, 858 N.Y.S. 2d 147, 149 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) 
(defendant's absence from jury voir dire constitutes per se reversible error). 
Other courts have imposed the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. 
Boone v. U.S., 483 A.2d 1135, 1140-42 (D.C. App. 1984); Robinson v. U.S., 448 A.2d 
853, 855-56 (D.C. App. 1982); Irby, 246 P.3d at 802-03. That standard places the 
burden on the prosecution to prove there was no injury. Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967). 
Under either standard, Martinez-Castellanos is able to establish prejudice. 
Under the Hopt standard, the error here was "irregular" and in violation of 
constitutional law and Utah law, warranting the entry of an order to vitiate the 
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convictions. 110 U.S. at 577-79; supra, Arg. 1.1. Under the harmless-beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard, prejudice is presumed and the prosecution must 
prove no injury, which it cannot do because jurors with biases served on the jury. 
See supra Arg. 1.2.2.2. 
Because Martinez-Castellanos' counsel failed to object to the irregularity of 
the jury-selection process and failed to protect Martinez-Castellanos' right to 
participate in that process, Martinez-Castellanos has been forced to raise the 
issue of the irregular voir dire proceedings under the ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel doctrine, which requires its own prejudice showing. Under that 
prejudice analysis, the defendant must show "a reasonable probability" that with 
the effective assistance of counsel, the jury would have had "a reasonable doubt 
respecting guilt." State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, ,r,r86, 92-93, 152 P.3d 321. A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome; it does not require a defendant to show that counsel's deficient 
representation "more likely than not altered the outcome in the case." Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 693-94. Rather, the standard is met if ineffective assistance rendered 
the proceeding "unreliable" and hence, "unfair." Id. at 694. 
In this case, counsel's ineffective assistance rendered the proceedings 
unreliable, and hence unfair, for several reasons. First, Martinez-Castellanos was 
not present to give meaningful input regarding decisions about more extensive 
voir dire, or about challenges for cause or peremptory strikes. Likewise, because 
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Martinez-Castellanos was not allowed to participate in jury voir dire, he was 
forced to accept jurors he knew nothing about, and jurors he likely would not 
have accepted on the panel, including Mangelson, Sachra, and Jones. Indeed, 
Mangelson failed to disclose in his questionnaire and during in-court 
questioning that he patrolled 1-15 for several years conducting traffic stops-just 
like the stop at issue here. R.440:9,18;461 at 2; see People v. Hunter, 250 A.D.2d 366, 
368-69 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (venireperson disclosed information in bifurcated 
voir dire outside defendant's presence and failed to repeat that information in 
open court resulting in reversible error). 
Second, a biased juror's participation in the trial is prejudicial. See e.g., 
Wach, 2001 UT 35, ,r36 (under the "harmless error" analysis, if defendant 
preserved the issue and a juror expressing bias sat on the jury, "the convictions 
would have to be overturned"). Juror Sachra revealed a strong bias or impression 
when she stated, "if a person had drugs in the car, they were probably guilty." 
R.415. She was allowed, nevertheless, to serve on the jury. 
Third, the juror bias in this case went to the central issue the jury was 
required to decide. While Juror Sachra considered a defendant to be guilty if he 
had drugs in the car, the jury here was required to decide whether drugs found 
in Martinez-Castellanos' car actually belonged to him or not. See R.440:186-92. 
Specifically, the State charged Martinez-Castellanos with several offenses, 
including two felony offenses for possession of methamphetamine and 
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hydrocodone.10 Martinez-Castellanos denied possession of those items. R.410-
11,425-26. He testified he purchased the car sometime before making the trip to 
Utah, the car was very cluttered when he purchased it, he did not have time to 
clean it, he was unaware that items of contraband were in the car-specifically, 
the methamphetamine and hydrocodone- and he denied that those items 
belonged to him. R.425-26,440:144-45. Whether Martinez-Castellanos possessed 
methamphetamine and hydrocodone was an issue for the jury, and it was a 
foregone conclusion for Juror Sachra even before she heard the evidence. R.415. 
Because Juror Sachra's bias had direct bearing on the central issue in the case, 
Martinez-Castellanos was prejudiced. State v. King, 2008 UT 54, ,r28, 190 P.3d 
1283 (" A defendant who is convicted of a crime by a jury comprised of even one 
member who has exhibited actual bias is entitled to a new trial") 
There is a reasonable likelihood that a jury free of bias would have given 
Martinez-Castellanos' testimony consideration and greater weight, and that such 
a jury would have resolved the case differently and more favorably to Martinez-
Castellanos. Specifically, Martinez-Castellanos admitted he used marijuana 
earlier, and he admitted he possessed the marijuana grinder. R.440:'37,143. 
However, he denied knowledge of and any intent to use or possess hydrocodone 
10 The State also charged Martinez-Castellanos with misdemeanor offenses 
involving weapons, marijuana paraphernalia, and metabolite. R.1-2. Martinez-
Castellanos acknowledged using marijuana before his trip to Utah, and he 
admitted that a marijuana grinder in the car belonged to him. R.440:143. 
36 
• 
, 
If 
and methamphetamine, which the State charged as felonies. R.440:143-44. Based 
on the testimony and jury instructions, the jury had several paths to choose from 
and "[d]epending on which of many paths was chosen, there were several 
possible outcomes, some of which may have resulted in conviction, and some of 
which may have resulted in acquittal." State v. Moore, 2012 UT 62, if 19,289 P.3d 
487. Indeed, a jury free of bias may have convicted Martinez-Castellanos of the 
misdemeanor charges and acquitted him of the felony charges. 
While it is "unclear what would have happened" if defense counsel had 
involved Martinez-Castellanos in jury selection, and it is unclear how a different 
jury would have viewed the evidence, those uncertainties support prejudice. Id. 
if 21. The question here is whether there was at least a reasonable probability of a 
different result had Martinez-Castellanos been allowed to participate in jury voir 
dire and selection, and this court should conclude "there was." Id. ,I19. 
Because Martinez-Castellanos was not allowed to participate in jury voir 
dire, and because defense counsel failed to challenge or to use peremptory 
strikes against individuals who demonstrated prejudice and bias, Martinez-
Castellanos was denied the right to participate in a material stage of the trial, he 
was denied the effective assistance of counsel, and he was denied the right to an 
impartial jury, thereby warranting the entry of an order reversing the convictions 
for a new trial. See Williams, 858 N.Y.S.2d 147. 
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2. Trooper Sheets unlawfully detained Martinez-Castellanos for further 
investigation and to search the car 
Next, Trooper Sheets violated Martinez-Castellanos' Fourth Amendment 
rights when he extended the detention beyond the initial purpose of the traffic 
stop without sufficient justification. Martinez-Castellanos has raised this issue 
under the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrine because defense counsel 
failed to make timely and proper arguments in support of a motion to suppress. 
Counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Martinez-Castellanos because it 
deprived him of the opportunity to have the district court assess and resolve 
conflicts in the evidence relevant to the extended stop, and because the evidence 
that Sheets discovered during the unlawful detention was the only evidence 
supporting the convictions. Under the circumstances, Martinez-Castellanos 
addresses the issue as follows: first, the trooper violated his rights with an 
unlawful extended detention; second, the evidence the trooper recovered during 
the unlawful detention should be suppressed; and third, counsel was ineffective 
for failing to raise the issue in the trial court. 
2.1 The trooper violated Martinez-Castellanos' rights with an 
unlawful extended detention 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, 
including unreasonable detentions. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, if 28, 63 P.3d 650. 
When an officer stops a vehicle for a routine traffic violation, the occupants are 
detained within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. The level-two 
detention in that instance is reasonable-and thus constitutional-if it satisfies a 
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two-prong assessment. First, the officer's actions in stopping the vehicle must be 
justified at inception. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994). Second, 
the detention must be "strictly tied to" the circumstances "which rendered [the 
detention's] initiation permissible," and must last "no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, if 17, 229 P.3d 650; 
State v. Weaver, 2007 UT App 292, if 12, 169 P.3d 760. 
If the officer's actions in stopping the vehicle are justified under the first 
prong, the officer may engage in a limited inquiry under the second prong as 
part of the traffic stop. State v. Adamson, 2013 UT App 22, ififl2-13, 295 P.3d 717. 
Once the officer has completed the limited inquiry, he must allow the occupants 
to be on their way. State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446,452 (Utah 1996). Alternatively, 
if, during the course of the limited inquiry, the officer forms new reasonable 
suspicion for other criminal activity, the officer may extend the detention to 
expediently investigate. Baker, 2010 UT 18, if if12-13, 31. 
This case involves the officer's actions under the second prong of the 
analysis. Trooper Sheets extended the traffic stop here to further investigate 
Martinez-Castellanos for substance abuse and to search the car. To justify the 
extended detention, Sheets was required to point to specific and articulable facts 
for "reasonable suspicion of a further illegality." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, if if31-32; 
Baker, 2010 UT 18, if ifl8,43 (evaluating the totality of the circumstances); State v. 
Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); R.650-51. While the level of 
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suspicion "is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of 
the evidence," the Supreme Court has ruled that an "inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch"' is insufficient. U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 
7, 15 (1989). In addition, this court will not view the facts in isolation. Baker, 2010 
UT 18, ,I44. It will consider the building blocks of facts and reasonable inferences 
to determine whether the sum of the whole supports reasonable suspicion. Id. 
Sheets articulated two points for the extended detention: Martinez-
Castellanos' "rapid" 1nanner and his 3-year-old criminal history. R.436:8,440:56. 
Notably, and over the course of the proceedings, the trooper changed his 
testimony as it related to those points. Specifically, the video of the traffic stop 
supports nothing unusual about Martinez-Castellanos' mannerisms and the 
trooper admitted that Martinez-Castellanos may have behaved his "normal 
way." R.440:56-57,99-100. Also, the 3-year-old history was stale. The sum of the 
whole is insufficient to support reasonable suspicion for the extended detention. 
2.1.1 Martinez-Castellanos' "rapid" manner 
Sheets testified that he extended the detention primarily because of 
Martinez-Castellanos' mannerisms. But that evidence is insufficient to justify an 
extended detention. In addition, the trooper's testimony is unsupported by the 
video of the traffic stop, and it changed at trial. The district court should be given 
the opportunity in remand proceedings to assess the evidence under the correct 
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legal analysis and under the totality of the circumstances.11 
This court has ruled that certain mannerisms exhibited by a defendant, 
when considered alone or even with other factors, fail to support reasonable 
suspicion. State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (nervous 
behavior, together with late hour and high crime area, were insufficient to form 
reasonable suspicion); State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(nervousness is insufficient). Courts in other jurisdictions have ruled similarly. 
State v. Parker, 723 So.2d 1066, 1069 (La. Ct. App. 1998) ("jittery" conduct not 
enough); U.S. v. Olson, 59 F.Supp.2d 725, 732 (M.D. Tenn. 1999) (nervous and 
rapid mannerisms do not support reasonable suspicion). 
Sheets testified during a pretrial motion to suppress hearing that Martinez-
Castellanos' speech during the traffic stop was "fast" and "jittery." R.436:8.12 At 
the time of the hearing, Sheets had not released the video of the stop to the 
prosecution or defense counsel. R.436:33-35. Then at trial, Sheets stated only that 
Martinez-Castellanos had rapid speech and movements. R.440:56-57,99. Those 
. 
11 An order to remand the case for further proceedings is ar,propriate because the 
record shows the district court was concerned in post-tria proceedings about 
Sheets' reasons for extending the detention. Martinez-Castellanos has addressed 
that issue in Arg. 3, infra. Moreover, the district court did not have access to the 
traffic-stop recording until trial; and that recording is relevant to an assessment 
under the total circumstances. R.436:34-37. 
12 Sheets testified at the suppression hearing that he "told [Martinez-Castellanos] 
he was bouncing around a little bit." R.436:9. Sheets did not explain himself: he 
did not explain if he made the statement to elicit something from Martinez-
Castellanos or if he actually observed Martinez-Castellanos bouncing or bouncy 
driving. Sheets did not repeat the "bouncing" or "jittery" assertion at trial. 
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purported facts do not reflect the total circumstances nor do they support new 
reasonable suspicion for an extended detention for several reasons. 
First, Sheets qualified his observation about "rapid" mannerisms: he 
admitted he was not familiar with Martinez-Castellanos and did not know if 
rapid manners were his "personal traits," or "personal speech." R.440:101. That 
admission is relevant because a court will give weight to an officer's experience, 
Baker, 2010 UT 18, ,T49, and Sheets admitted on direct examination that Martinez-
Castellanos' manner could have been his "normal way." R.440:56-57. 
Second, at trial, the trooper referred to the video as reflective of Martinez-
Castellanos' rapid mannerisms. R.440:99. The prosecution played portions of the 
video at trial, and the district court would have reviewed it as well. The video is 
objective evidence. It fails to support that Martinez-Castellanos' speech or 
manners were rapid or unusual. R.434. In fact, the trooper did most of the talking 
and had a very brief interaction with Martinez-Castellanos before he took actions 
to extend the stop. See R.460:2-3. Those facts would have been relevant to the 
district court under the totality of the circumstances. 
Sheets testified at the suppression hearing that he was motivated to 
continue the detention because of defendant's manner. R.436:28. But that fact is 
insufficient under the total circumstances to support the continued detention. 
2.1.2 Martinez-Castellanos' criminal history 
Sheets testified that Martinez-Castellanos' criminal record "kind of added 
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to [his] suspicions." R.436:28. This court previously ruled that a criminal record 
"does nothing to establish that [the defendant] is currently dealing in controlled 
substances," particularly if his most recent arrest was "two years prior to the 
events in the case at bar." State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); 
see also State v. Keener, 2008 UT App 288, ,r12 n.6, 191 P.3d 835 (5-plus year-old 
arrest record is irrelevant, but 7-month-old history may be part of the 
consideration). Brooks involved the probable-cause standard for a warrant. 
This case involves the reasonable suspicion standard.13 In that context, this 
court ruled that a defendant's criminal history "can be a factor in determining 
reasonable suspicion" under some circumstances. Humphrey, 937 P.2d at 143. It 
can be a factor together with other facts and circumstances if the criminal activity 
is "ongoing," as in Humphrey, id., or if the officer has personal knowledge of an 
individual's criminal record. U.S. v. Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 
1980). In Chamberlin, the officer knew the defendant and his companion, and the 
officer was personally familiar with their criminal histories. Id. When the officer 
encountered the men, causing them to flee, the officer's personal knowledge of 
their histories supported reasonable suspicion. Id.; see also U.S. v. Johnson, 427 
F.3d 1053, 1057 (7th Cir. 2005) (reiterating that a criminal history is only relevant 
13 Probable cause and reasonable suspicion differ in terms of the "degree of 
suspicion necessary to establish each one." Humphrey, 937 P.2d at 144 n.2. The 
standards are alike in that both standards rely on the content of information 
possessed by the police and the reliability of that information. Id. at 141. 
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in conjunction with other information supporting reasonable suspicion); Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000) (suspect' s unprovoked flight upon noticing 
police in known drug neighborhood supports reasonable suspicion). 
Under the totality of the circumstances, Sheets' reference to Martinez-
Castellanos' criminal history is unavailing for several reasons. First, the criminal 
history is insufficient to support reasonable suspicion even when it is considered 
with other factors because the history was three years old, and Sheets admitted 
he did not personally know Martinez-Castellanos, his history, or his mannerisms. 
R.440:56-57,101; Humphrey, 937 P.2d at 143. 
Second, Sheets stated that the criminal history "kind of added to [his] 
suspicions," but the history "wasn't the reason" he extended the detention to 
further investigate Martinez-Castellanos, supporting the determination that 
Sheets relied primarily on information that admittedly was insufficient for him 
because he did not know Martinez-Castellanos: that is, he relied on Martinez-
Castellanos' mannerisms. R.436:28; see supra, Arg. 2.1.1. 
Third, as in Brooks and Keener, Martinez-Castellanos' stale history did 
nothing to support that" [ defendant] is currently dealing in controlled 
substances." Brooks, 849 P.2d at 644; Keener, 2008 UT App 288, 112 n.6. 
Fourth, if probable cause and reasonable suspicion are alike in that both 
standards depend on the content of information possessed by the police and its 
degree of reliability (supra n. 13, herein), the quantity and quality of information 
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here are insufficient: Sheets observed Martinez-Castellanos' manner and then 
admitted at trial that his observations were not reliable because Martinez-
Castellanos may have been acting normally; also, the criminal history was three 
years old. Under the totality of the circumstances, the facts and inferences fail to 
support justification for the extended detention. 
2.1.3 Other factors relevant to the total circumstances 
Other factors weigh against the determination that Sheets had reasonable 
suspicion to support the extended detention. First, the video recording shows 
that Martinez-Castellanos was polite and cooperative. R.434;436:30;460:2-14. 
Second, as Sheets continued the detention for further investigation, Martinez-
Castellanos answered clearly and honestly. R.440:45,65,143;460:3,5 
(acknowledging he had an inactive Colorado license and knife; admitting the 
empty marijuana grinder belonged to him and that he used medical marijuana 
before his trip). 
Third, Sheets changed his story. At the motion to suppress hearing and 
before Sheets released the traffic-stop video, he claimed that Martinez-
Castellanos' conduct was jittery. R.436:8. At trial, after he released the video to 
the defense, he stated that Martinez-Castellanos spoke and moved rapidly and 
he referred to the video, which the court would have been able to view. R.440:99. 
In addition, Sheets testified at the suppression hearing that he first observed 
Martinez-Castellanos and the missing license-plate sticker when he was stopped 
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on the northbound shoulder of the Interstate. R.436:31-32. Then at trial, he 
testified that he was traveling in the southbound lanes when he made a U-turn to 
accelerate to Martinez-Castellanos with lights engaged. R.440:42,93-95. 
The district court was concerned by the trial evidence but did not have the 
opportunity to address it in a proper motion. R.268 ("based on the testimony 
elicited at trial," the court noted Martinez-Castellanos had an argument for a 
motion to suppress that counsel failed to pursue); see supra pp. 10-12. 
In this case, the totality of the circumstances supports that Sheets 
unlawfully extended the detention beyond the purpose of the stop simply to 
assess whether rapid speech was Martinez-Castellanos' normal way. R.440:101 
("Like I said at the beginning of trial ... I don't know his personal speech. That's 
why we get him out and do the field sobrieties to rule that out."). 
2.2 Sheets discovered contraband during the extended detention 
During the unlawful extended detention, Sheets asked Martinez-
Castellanos to step out of the car for field-sobriety tests and he discovered items 
giving rise to the charges in this case. Supra pp. 5-6. Under the fruit-of-the-
poisonous-tree doctrine, that evidence, which came to light as a result of the 
unlawful detention, is inadmissible. See Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 
(1963). 
The inadmissible evidence includes the knives and/ or the box cutter, the 
marijuana grinder and lighter, the methamphetamine, the hydrocodone, and the 
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other items of contraband that Sheets collected from the car. R.440:5-13. 
Martinez-Castellanos respectfully requests that this court remand this case 
for further proceedings on the extended detention. Remand will allow the 
district court to consider the total circumstances, including Sheets' various 
statements about the traffic stop, rapid speech, Martinez-Castellanos' "normal 
way," and the video; and to make findings pertinent to the search and seizure 
issue. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-89 (Utah 1991) (findings on 
suppression issues are necessary to enable meaningful review); R.57,394 
(denying pre- and post-trial motions without findings or analysis). 
2.3 Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to make proper and 
meritorious arguments to suppress the evidence 
Because defense counsel failed to make arguments in support of a motion 
to suppress the evidence as set forth above, Martinez-Castellanos has addressed 
this extended-detention issue under the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
doctrine. The standard for ineffective assistance is stated supra, Arg. 1.2. See State 
v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Martinez-Castellanos is able to 
overcome the presumption that counsel's conduct may be considered sound trial 
strategy, and he is able to demonstrate deficient performance and prejudice. Id. 
2.3.1 Counsel's conduct was deficient 
Specifically, under the first prong of the analysis, counsel's conduct was 
deficient, not strategic. Counsel was indifferent or ignorant to the facts and the 
law and his conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Under 
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the law, counsel has a duty "to bring to bear" skill and knowledge to render the 
trial "a reliable adversarial testing process." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. He must 
stay current on the law. State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688,692 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
He has a duty to make appropriate objections and motions. ABA Stds for Crim. 
Justice, Pro. Function & Def. Function (3d ed. 1993) (" ABA Stds"), §§ 4-3.6,4-7.9. 
He must consider procedural steps which may be taken in good faith, including 
the "obvious step[]" for suppression of evidence. Id. § 4-3.6 & commentary. 
In this case, defense counsel failed to bring to bear the skill and knowledge 
necessary to present a proper motion to suppress. He was inattentive to the law 
and rules, he was untimely, and he failed to protect Martinez-Castellanos' rights. 
Specifically, counsel filed an initial motion to suppress referencing "consent." He 
presented no argument to support the motion. R.32-33; see Utah R. Crim. P. 
12(d)(3). The prosecution opposed the motion and its arguments went 
unanswered, prompting the court to deny the motion. R.38-40,42-56,57. 
At the time of trial and after trial, defense counsel filed two additional 
motions, again without supporting memoranda, and again asking the court to 
suppress the evidence. R.142-43,296-97. The prosecution opposed those motions 
as untimely and deficient under the rules. R.144-45,382-92; Utah R. Crim. P. 
12(d). The district court ultimately denied those motions as well. R.394. 
The first prong of the analysis is satisfied: The record reveals that while 
counsel intended to challenge the evidence in a motion to suppress, he failed to 
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make timely and proper arguments for suppression of the evidence. Counsel's 
actions were "contrary to professional norms," and they "betray[] a lack of the 
essential legal knowledge needed to meet the case of the prosecution." State v. 
Johnson, 837 A.2d 1131, 1136 (N.J. Super. 2003). 
Indeed, if counsel had made a proper motion to suppress, "there would 
have been 'a full airing of the evidence before trial."' Id. at 1137. That point is 
particularly relevant here for several reasons. First, the traffic-stop video is 
relevant to a motion to suppress. It shows that Martinez-Castellanos behaved 
normally. R.434,460:2-18. The district court viewed it at trial and then expressed 
concern with the extended detention. R.268. The district court should be given 
the opportunity in remand proceedings to view the "full[y] air[ed]" evidence, 
including the video, and to weigh its relevance as part of the analysis. 
Second, Sheets admitted at trial that he did not know if Martinez-
Castellanos' mannerisms were his "normal way" or indicative of something else. 
R.440:57. The district court should be allowed to assess that evidence together 
with the other circumstances (including the video) and to give that evidence the 
weight it deems appropriate. 
Third, Sheets changed his story at trial. Compare, e.g., R.436:31-32 with 
R.440:42,93-95. The district court should be given the opportunity to weigh 
Sheets' testimony under the total circumstances and in light of those facts. Other 
courts have ruled that under similar circumstances, the appellate court may 
49 
"remand the matter to ensure, upon proper motion by defendant, a full hearing 
of all such evidence." Johnson, 837 A.2d at 1137. This case warrants a hearing to 
fully air the evidence. Id.; see infra, Arg. 3. 
2.3.2 Counsel's deficient performance resulted in prejudice 
Under the second prong of the analysis, Martinez-Castellanos is required 
to show that if counsel had made meritorious arguments for suppression, there is 
a reasonable probability that the district court would have made findings to 
support his motion, and the verdict would have been different due to the 
excluded evidence. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,375 (1986); State v. 
Stewart, 2014 UT App 289, if 11, -- P.3d --. Stated another way, a defendant must 
demonstrate that a proper motion "would have resulted in suppression of the 
evidence." State v. Mitchell, 2013 UT App 289, if 17,318 P.3d 238. 
Martinez-Castellanos has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that a 
proper motion would have resulted in suppression of the evidence. The district 
court is uniquely situated to weigh and assess the evidence. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
787-89. If the court had been given the opportunity to fully consider and weigh 
the evidence, the court likely would have given little weight to Sheets' assertions 
that Martinez-Castellanos exhibited rapid or jittery mannerisms. In the context of 
a proper motion, the court would have viewed the total circumstances-
including the video that shows Martinez-Castellanos behaving normally, and the 
trooper's admission that Martinez-Castellanos may have behaved his "normal 
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way" -to rule that Sheets relied on nothing more than a 3-year-old criminal 
record and a suspicion or hunch to extend the stop. 
If the district court had been allowed to assess those issues, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the court would have made findings to support 
Martinez-Castellanos' motion to suppress the evidence, thereby leading to a 
different result. Indeed, the State prosecuted Martinez-Castellanos based on the 
information and evidence Sheets collected only after he extended the detention 
for the additional investigation and search. See supra Arg. 2.2. "Given the critical 
significance of the evidence to [the State's] successful prosecution," this court 
should "find that defendant suffered prejudice from his attorney's failure to 
make a timely [and proper] suppression motion.'' Johnson, 837 A.2d at 1136. 
3. The district court denied Martinez-Castellanos the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel in post-trial proceedings 
A criminal defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel at all 
stages of the criminal proceedings, including post-trial proceedings. See Kitchen v. 
U.S., 227 F.3d 1014, 1018-19 (7th Cir. 2000); Robinson v. Norris, 60 F.3d 457,460 
(8th Cir. 1995); Baker v. Kaiser, 929 F.2d 1495,1498-99 (10th Cir. 1991); Menefield v. 
Borg, 881 F.2d 696,699 (9th Cir. 1989); Nelson v. Peyton, 415 F.2d 1154, 1157 (4th 
Cir. 1969); ABA Stds § 4-7.9. A defendant is able in post-trial proceedings to 
investigate and present argument on any issue which substantially and 
adversely affected his rights. Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a). A defendant may even 
investigate issues of ineffective assistance at that stage of the proceedings. See 
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State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, if 71, 152 P.3d 321. 
In this case, the district court set in motion a post-trial investigation under 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24 to assess arguments for a meritorious 
motion to suppress and to assess ineffective assistance of counsel. R.268. But the 
court failed to appoint counsel to represent Martinez-Castellanos in the 
proceedings. Indeed, the court simply appointed an attorney as amicus to 
address one distinct issue for the court, and it allowed the State to address the 
issue as well. R.274,279-86. While the court should be commended for its part in 
recognizing and calling for post-trial proceedings to address ineffective 
assistance, it erred when it failed to appoint conflict counsel to represent 
Martinez-Castellanos in a meaningful way. That was plain error. 
To succeed on a claim of plain error, a defendant must establish that" (i) 
[a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) 
the error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). Martinez-
Castellanos is able to establish each factor under the analysis. 
First, an error exists. The district court erred in failing to appoint counsel to , 
represent Martinez-Castellanos in post-trial proceedings to address possible 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a Motion to 
Dismiss because he discovered that the trooper made misstatements at the 
pretrial hearing relevant to the initial traffic stop. R.142-43. The district court did 
not rule on that motion, but rather filed its own post-trial motion because it had 
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"a question about [the] suppression hearing issues." R.422. Namely, the court 
"was concerned that the evidence was insufficient to allow Trooper Sheets to ask 
Mr. Martinez-Castellanos to step out of the car." Id. Also, the court specified that 
its concerns about the extended detention were separate from defense counsel's 
concerns as expressed in the Motion to Dismiss. R.441:4. 
The court specified that its concerns arose as a result of "testimony elicited 
at trial." Id.; R.422,424-25. And the court set the matter for a post-trial hearing. 
At the hearing, the prosecution requested that the district court appoint 
conflict counsel to represent Martinez-Castellanos. R.441:1. The court agreed to 
"appoint[] conflict counsel for purposes of this sua sponte motion" to assess 
ineffective assistance of counsel and "specifically" whether the officer had any 
justification for extending the stop to "hav[e] [Martinez-Castellanos] step out of 
the car and further perform DRE tests or field sobriety tests; whether there was 
reasonable suspicion." R.441:6,7-8. The court wanted to know, "was there a 
justification to extend the investigation?" R.441:8. The court had a "kernel of 
concern" that defense counsel failed to follow up with proper suppression 
arguments which "may have had a significant outcome on the case." R.441:13. 
The court, however, subsequently appointed counsel to serve only as II amicus." 
See R.279-86. Because Martinez-Castellanos was entitled to the representation of 
counsel, even in these unusual sua sponte proceedings, the court erred in 
appointing arnicus counsel rather than conflict counsel. 
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Second, the error was obvious. A court-appointed amicus does not serve 
the same function as a court-appointed attorney for a criminal defendant in a 
felony case." An amicus curiae is an officer of the court when so appointed. The 
court may appoint an amicus curiae to present argument, to make an 
investigation and conduct the hearing in contempt proceedings, and to brief and 
present the question of the jurisdiction of the trial court." 3B C.J.S. Amicus Curiae 
§ 13. An amicus may take action "without reference to the defendant." Id. And an 
amicus owes no duty of loyalty to the defendant. 
Counsel appointed to assist the defendant, on the other hand, owes such a 
duty of loyalty. Holland, 876 P.2d at 359. A defendant is "wholly dependent" on 
his appointed counsel to protect his interests. Id. 
In this case, when the district court expressed concerns about the extended 
detention and defense counsel's failure to argue the issues, it should have 
appointed conflict counsel to represent Martinez-Castellanos. If the district court 
had appointed conflict counsel, the court would have learned that defense 
counsel was ignorant of or indifferent to meritorious arguments challenging the 
extended detention. See supra, Arg. 2. Indeed, even in post-trial proceedings, 
counsel persisted in failing to present timely and proper arguments and he 
persisted in failing to address the extended detention. R.296-97,382-92. 
The differences between amicus counsel and Sixth-Amendment-appointed 
counsel are plain. The district court's failure to appreciate those differences 
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interfered with Martinez-Castellanos' right to counsel at a critical stage of the 
proceedings; and Martinez-Castellanos was left without representation of 
counsel in post-trial proceedings involving the extended detention. 
Third, the error was prejudicial. Because the court appointed amicus rather 
than conflict counsel, Martinez-Castellanos had no opportunity to address 
whether counsel was ineffective for failing to address the issue of the extended 
detention. Instead, amicus simply advised the court that defense counsel was not 
ineffective because the district court denied the motion to suppress: 
[It] is difficult if not impossible to find that Defendant's failure to file 
a legal memo rand um could satisfy the second prong of the Strickland 
test ... because implicit in the court's denial of the motion to 
suppress, with or without a legal memorandum, is a finding and 
conclusion of law that the State met its burden in establishing that 
the evidence was obtained legally. 
R.279-86. The amicus made no effort to address the extended detention or the 
evidence presented in the case dealing with the trooper's actions. Id. Yet, as set 
forth above, Martinez-Castellanos had meritorious arguments for suppressing 
the evidence that defense counsel failed to develop. Supra, Arg. 2. If the court 
had appointed conflict counsel, there is a reasonable likelihood that the district 
court would have suppressed the evidence. Id. To obviate the error, this court 
should remand this case for the appointment of conflict counsel who will 
provide the duty of loyalty to Martinez-Castellanos in addressing the search and 
seizure issue for the district court's proper consideration. 
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Conclusion 
Martinez-Castellanos respectfully requests that this court reverse the 
conviction and remand for a new trial, or for further proceedings. 
DATED this 8th day of January, 2015. 
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER LLC 
Linda M. Jones 
Noella A. Sudbury 
Attorneys for Defendant/ Appellant 
Abisai Martinez-Castellanos 
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - JUAB 
JUAB COUNTY I STATE OF UTAH 
HLE.9 IN 
lHH Cl'.ff·ltiO-:T'ce.un 
sr.•.TEOFUTA'H 
.ll.1! . :: Ct: IJIH} 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, 
NOTICE 
13 FEB 25 AH 11: 37r0' 
COMMITMENT ...... D 
vs. 
ABISAI MARTINEZ-CASTELLANOS, 
Defendant. 
PRESENT 
Clerk: cindyj 
Prosecutor: HOWARD, ANNMARIE T 
Defendant 
Case No: 101600146 FS 
Judge: JAMES BRADY 
Date: February 14, 2013 
Defendant's Attorney(s): HARMON, MILTON T 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 16, 1981 · 
Audio 
Tape Count: 11:30:07 
CHARGES 
5~ 
1. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/01/2012 Guilty 
2. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/01/2012 Guilty 
4 • DRIVING WITH MEASURABLE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - Class B 
Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty 
5. POSSESSION OF DRUG 
Plea: Not Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
- Disposition: 11/01/2012 Guilty 
PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor 
- Disposition:,11/01/2012 Guilty 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE · a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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Case No: 101600146 Date: Feb 14, 2013 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 30 day(s) in the Juab County Jail. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING WITH MEASURABLE 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) in the Juab County Jail. The 
total time suspended for this charge is 180 day{s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to 
a term of 180 day(s) in the Juab County Jail. The total time 
suspended for this charge is 180 day(s). 
Credit is granted for 15 previously served. 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
All charges are to run concurrent with each other. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge# 1 Fine: $9533.00 
Suspended: $7651.00 
Surcharge: $882.54 
Due: $1882.00 
Charge# 2 . Fine: $9533.00 
Suspended: $9533.00 
Due: $0.00 
Charge# 4 Fine: $1933.00 
Suspended: $1933.00 
Due: $0.00 
Charge# 5 Fine: $1933.00 
Suspended: $1933.00 
Due: $0.00 
Total Fine: $22932.00 
Total Suspended: $21050.00 
Total Surcharge: $882.54 
Total Principal Due: $1882.00 
Plus Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 24 month{s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 30 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Juab County Jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1882.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
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Case No: 101600146 Date: Feb 14, 2013 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Defendant is ordered to enter into an agreement with the Adult 
Probation and Parole Department and comply strictly with the terms 
of probation. 
Defendant is ordered to make himself/herself available to the Adult 
Probation and Parole _and to the Court when requested to do so. 
Defendant is ordered to not violate the laws of the United States, 
the State of Utah, the laws of any state or any municipality. 
Defendant is ordered not to use, consume or possess alcohol or 
illegal drugs, nor associate with any people using, possessing or 
consuming alcohol or illegal drugs and not frequent establishments 
where alcohol is the chief item of order. 
Defendant is to undergo a substance abuse evaluation and follow 
through with the recommended treatment. 
Defendant is ordered to provide his high school diploma or complete 
his GED. 
With Mr. Harmon advising the Court he will be filing a motion for a 
new trial, the Court orders the imposition of sentencing stayed for 
6 weeks for the motion to be filed and hearing date set. 
NOTICE: THE DEFENDANT HAS 30 DAYS FROM TODAY'S DATE TO FILE AN 
APPEAL IF HE SO CHOOSES. 
Before Judge: 
Date: 
·9: . _ ,. , · Court Judge 
~~~ •~"f-.~,(~:·r ~~ e,';:;i.f':-r-1-
Indi viduals needing spec1a':tf~ac2'8minodations (including auxiliary 
communicative aids and services) should call CINDY at 435-623-0901 
three days prior to the hearing. For TTY service call Utah Relay 
at 800-346-4128. The general information phone number is 
435-623-0901. 
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Amendment IV. Search and Seizure, USCA CONST Amend. IV-Search and Seizure 
United States Code Annotated 
Constitution of the United States . 
A.:nnotated · · . . 
Amendment IV. Searches and Seizures (Refs & Armos) 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. IV-Search and Seizure 
Amendment IV. Search and Seizure 
Curren t:ness 
<Notes of Decisions for this amendment are displayed in four separate documents. Notes ofDecisions for subdivisions 
I to XI are contained in this document. For Notes of Decisions for subdivisions XII to XXIV, see the second document 
for Amend. IV-Search and Seizure. For Notes of Decisions for subdivisions XXV to XXXIV see the third document 
for Amend. IV-Search and Seizure. For Notes of Decisions for subdivisions XXXV to end, see the fourth document 
for Amend IV -Search and Seizure.> 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Notes of Decisions ( 4444) 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. IV-Search and Seizure, USCA CONST Amend. IV-Search and Seizure 
Current through P.L. 113-209 approved 12-16-2014 
End of Document (£') 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Governmem Works. 
\','"'.:"•'. =•.:Next© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
' 
Amendment VI. Jury t rials for crimes, and procedural rights, USCA CONST Amend .... 
. United States Code Annotated 
Constitution of the United States 
Annotated 
Amendment VI. Jury Trial for Crimes, and Procedural Rights (Refs & • .\nnos) 
U.S.C.A Const. Amend. VI-Jury Trials 
Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights 
Cuffentness 
<Notes of Decisions for this amendment are displayed in three separate documents. Notes of Decisions for 
subdivisions I through XX are contained in this document. For Notes of Decisions for subdivisions XXI through 
XXIX, see the second document for Amend. VI. For Notes of Decisions for subdivisions XXX through XXXIII, see 
the third document for Amend. VI.> 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Notes of Decisions (5159) 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. VI-Jury Trials, USCA CONST Amend. VI-Jury Trials 
Current through P.L. 113-209 approved 12-16-2014 
End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV-Full Text 
AMENDMENTXIV.CffiZENSHIP;PRlVILEGESANDIMMUNITIES;DUE 
PROCESS; EQUAL PROTECTION; APPOINTMENT OF REPRESENTATION; 
DISQUALlFICA.TION OF OFFICERS; PUBLlC DEBT; ENFORCEMENT 
Currentness 
:· . _:· ·. ~: .· 
. : .. ;.:.· 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equa~ protection of the laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of 
electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers 
of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one 
years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the 
basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole 
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any 
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of 
Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of 
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or 
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. Toe validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of 
pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States 
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, 
or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. Toe Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
<Section 1 of this amendment is further displayed in separate documents according to subject matter,> 
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § I-Citizens> 
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § I -Privileges> 
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<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 1-Due Proc> 
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV,§ I-Equal Protect> 
<sections 2 to 5 of this amendment are displayed as separate documents,> 
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 2,> 
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 3,> 
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 4,> 
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 5,> 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV-Full Text, USCA CONST Amend. XIV-Full Text 
Current through P.L. I 13-209 approved 12-16-2014 
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Sec. 7. [Due process of law], UT CONST Art. 1, § 7 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Constitution of Utah 
Article I. Declaration of Rights 
U.CA 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 7 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law] 
Currentness 
No person shall be deprived oflife, liberty or property, without due process oflaw. 
Notes of Decisions (624) 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 7, UT CONST Art. 1, § 7 
Current through 2014 General Session. 
End of Document (!;1 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original u.S. Govemment Works. 
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Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons], UT CONST Art. 1, § 12 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Constitution of Utah 
Article I. Declaration bf Rights · 
U.C.A 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 12 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons] 
CmTentness 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial 
by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in 
all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the 
use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine 
probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as 
defined by statute or rule. 
Credits 
Laws 1994, S.J.R. 6, § 1, adopted at election Nov. 8, 1994, eff. Jan. 1, 1995. 
Notes of Decisions (1504) 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 12, UT CONST Art. 1, § 12 
Current through 2014 General Session. 
End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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§ 77-1-6. Rights of defendant, UT ST§ 77-1-6 
-: West's Utah Code Annotated -:. __ , 
. ,:: _: Title 77:. Utah Code· ~f Criminal ~o~d~e . 
.. . : .. : . ch~pter i >Preliminary Provisitms · 
. : .. : :· 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-1-6 
-: . 
§ 77-1-6. Rights of defendant 
Currentness 
(I) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; 
·-. 
-: . 
·.-:::.•-·· -.... . 
.:·-: 
·· .. . . : .... •, / .. 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if 
unable to post bail and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by 
the Constitution or the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against him.self; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a husband against his wife; and 
'Nesi!.3wNext" © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 
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( e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a 
court when trial by jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a magistrate. 
Credits 
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2. 
Codifications C. 1953, § 77-1-5. 
Notes of Decisions (234) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-1-6, UT ST§ 77-1-6 
Current through 2014 General Session. 
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. 
. 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
State Court Rules• 
. . . . 
Utah Rules of C1iminal Procedure 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 17 
RULE 17. THE TRLi\L 
CmTentness 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel. The defendant shall be 
personally present at the trial with the following exceptions: 
(a)( 1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent in writing to trial in his absence; 
(a)(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to 
defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall have 
the same effect as if defendant had been present; and 
(a)(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, 
or obstreperous conduct. 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal attendance of the defendant at the trial. 
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order: 
(b)(l) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody; 
(bX2) felony cases when defendant is in custody; 
(b )(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and 
(b)(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance. 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury in open court with the approval of the court and 
the consent of the prosecution. 
( d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the 
court orders otherwise. No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
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(e) In all cases, the number of members ofa trial jury shall be as specified in Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953. 
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation 
in writing or made orally in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress with any number of jurors less 
than otherwise required. 
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in the following order: 
(gXl) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(gX2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the defense may make an opening statement or reserve 
it until the prosecution has rested; 
(g)(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge; 
(gX4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case; 
(gX5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, for good cause, otherwise permits; 
(g)(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the court shall instruct the jury; and 
(gX7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides without argument, the prosecution shall open the 
argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument The court may set 
reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each party and the time to be allowed for argument 
(b) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an alternate juror has been selected, the case shall proceed using 
the alternate juror. If no alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed with the number of jurors remaining. 
Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged and a new trial ordered. 
(i) Questions by jurors. A judge may invite jurors to submit written questions to a witness as provided in this section. 
(i)(l) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shall control the process to ensure the jury maintains its role 
as the impartial finder of fact and does not become an investigative body. The judge may disallow any question from a juror 
and may discontinue questions from jurors at any time. 
(i)(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge should advise the jurors that they may write the question as it 
occurs to them and. submit the question to the bailiff for transmittal to the judge. The judge should advise the jurors that some 
questions might not be allowed. 
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(i)(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and unrepresented parties and rule upon any objection to the question. 
The judge may disallow a question even though no objection is made. The judge shall preserve the written question in the 
court file. If the question is allowed, the judge shall ask the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented party to ask it. The 
question may be rephrased into proper form. The judge shall allow counsel and unrepresented parties to examine the witness 
after the juror's question. 
G) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, or in which any other material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the charge of an 
officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall 
be sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so appointed to speak to them 
nor to do so himself on any subject connected with the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a 
specified time. 
(k) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by 
the court that it is their duty not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to be addressed by, 
any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case 
is fmally submitted to them. 
(I) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits which have been 
received as evidence, except exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury, such as exhibits 
of unusual size, weapons or contraband. The court shall permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are entitled to take 
notes during the trial and to have those notes with them during deliberations. As necessary, the court shall provide jurors with 
writing materials and instruct the jury on taking and using notes. 
(m) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together in some convenient place under charge of an 
officer until they agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by order of the court, 
the officer having them under his charge shall not allow any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except 
to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person 
the state of their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon. 
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall 
inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then direct that the jury 
be brought before the court where, in the presence of the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry 
or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its discretion 
respond to the inquiry in writing without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and the response 
thereto shall be entered in the record. 
( o) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or 
the jury may be sent out again. 
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an order 
dismissing any information or indictment, or any count thereof: upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to 
establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense. 
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Credits 
[Amended effective November l, 2001; November l, 2002.) 
Editors' Notes 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Paragraph ([). The committee recommends amending paragraph (l) to establish the right of jurors to take notes and to have 
those notes with them during deliberations. The committee recommends removing depositions from the paragraph not in order 
to permit the jurors to have depositions but to recognize that depositions are not evidence. Depositions read into evidence will 
be treated as any other oral testimony. These amendments and similar amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure will make 
the two provisions identical. 
Notes of Decisions (329) 
Rules Crim. Proc., Rule 17, UT R RCRP Rule 17 
Current with amendments received through 11/15/14 
End of Document 0 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to 01iginal U.S. Government Works. 
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RULE 18. SELECTION OF THE JURY, UT R RCRP Rule 18 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 18 
RULE 18. SELECTION OF THE JURY 
Currentness 
: .. 
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. -·:: 
. ··: ~.- -=~;~--:· 
-: ...... }~· . 
. ·::. ·_. ·.: 
(a) The judge shall determine the method of selecting the jury and notify the parties at a pretrial conference or otherwise prior 
to trial The following procedures for selection are not exclusive. 
( a)(l) Strike and replace method. The court shall summon the number of the jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional 
number as will allow for any alternates, for all peremptory challenges permitted, and for all challenges for cause granted. At 
the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call jurors in random order. The judge may hear and determine challenges for cause 
during the course of questioning or at the end thereof. The judge may and, at the request of any party, shall hear and determine 
challenges for cause outside the hearing of the jurors. After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to 
fill the vacancy, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk 
shall provide a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory 
challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. 
The clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, including any 
alternate jurors, and the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. If alternate jurors have been selected, the 
last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire. 
(a)(2) Struck method The court shall summon the number of jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as 
will allow for any alternates, for all peremptory challenges permitted and for all challenges for cause granted. At the direction 
of the judge, the clerk shall call jurors in random order. The judge may hear and determine challenges for cause during the 
course of questioning or at the end thereof. The judge may and, at the request of any party, shall hear and determine challenges 
for cause outside the hearing of the jurors. When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall provide a list of the 
jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at 
a time in regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, 
or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, including any alternate jurors, and the persons whose names 
are so called shall constitute the jury. If alternate jurors have been selected, the last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless 
otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire. 
(a)(3) In courts using lists of prospective jurors generated in random order by computer, the clerk may call the jurors in that 
random order. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the examination of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct 
the examination. In the latter event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the examination by such 
further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit to the prospective jurors additional questions requested by counsel or 
the defendant Prior to examining the jurors, the court may make a prelimmary statement of the case. The court may permit the 
parties or their attorneys to make a preliminary statement of the case, and notify the parties in advance of trial 
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( c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror. 
(c)(l) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or for the trial ofa particular action. A challenge to the 
panel is an objection made to all jurors summoned and may be taken by either party. 
( c )(I Xi) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the procedure prescribed with respect to 
the selection, drawing, summoning and return of the panel. 
(c)(lXii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is sworn and shall be in writing or made upon the record. It 
shall specifically set forth the facts constituting the grounds of the challenge. 
(c)(l)(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a hearing may be had to try any question of fact upon 
which the challenge is based. The jurors challenged, and any other persons, may be called as witnesses at the hearing thereon. 
(c)(l)(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to the panel is allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far 
as the trial in question is concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall direct the selection of jurors to proceed. 
( c )(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made 
only before the jury is sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made after the juror is sworn 
but before any of the evidence is presented. In challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges to a panel and hearings 
thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall be talcen first by the prosecution and then by the defense. 
( d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled 
to 1 O peremptory challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor cases, 
each side is entitled to three peremptory challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may allow the defendants 
additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly. 
( e) A challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and shall be heard and determined by the court. The juror challenged 
and any other person may be examined as a witness on the hearing of such challenge. A challenge for cause may be talcen on 
one or more of the following grounds. On its own motion the court may remove a juror upon the same grounds. 
(e)(I) Want of any of the qualifications prescn"bed by law. 
( e )(2) Any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of performing the duties of a juror. 
( e)(3) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose 
complaint the prosecution was instituted. 
( e )( 4) The existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relationship between the prospective juror and any party, 
witness or person alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed objectively, 
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would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would 
be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because the juror is indebted to or employed by the 
state or a political subdivision thereof. 
(e)(5) Having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil action, or having complained against or having been 
accused by the defendant in a criminal prosecution. 
(e)(6) Having served on the grand jury which found the indictment 
( e )(7) Having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the particular offense charged. 
( e )(8) Having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged 
without a verdict after the case was submitted to it 
( e)(9) Having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defendant for the act charged as an offense. 
( e )(10) If the offense charged is punishable with death, the juror's views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially 
impair the performance of the juror's duties as a juror in accordance with the instructions of the court and the juror's oath in 
subsection (h). 
( e )(11) Because the juror is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or interested in carrying on any business, calling 
or employment, the carrying on of which is a violation oflaw, where defendant is charged with a like offense. 
(e)(12) Because the juror has been a witness, either for or against the defendant on the preliminary examination or before the 
grand jury. 
( e)(I3) Having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the 
offense charged. 
(e}(l4) Conduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances that reasonably lead the court to conclude the juror is not 
likely to act impartially. No person may serve as a juror, if challenged, unless the judge is. convinced the juror can and will 
act impartially and fairly. 
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense alternately. Challenges for cause shall 
be completed before peremptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impaneled. Alternate jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace 
jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or disqualified to perform their duties. The 
prosecution and defense shall each have one additional peremptory challenge for each alternate juror to be chosen. Alternate 
jurors shall be selected at the same time and in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same 
examination and challenges, shall take the same oath and shall have the same functions, powers, and privileges as principal 
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jurors. Except in bifurcated proceedings, an alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged when the 
jury retires to consider its verdict. The identity of the alternate jurors may be withheld until the jurors begin deliberations. 
(h) When the jwy is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well 
and truly try the matter in issue between the parties, and render a true verdict according to the evidence and the instructions 
of the court. 
Credits 
[Amended effective November 1, 2001; November 1, 2007.J 
Editors' Notes 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Paragraph (b ). The preliminary statement of the case does not serve the same purpose as the opening statement presented after 
the jury is selected. The preliminary statement of the case serves only to provide a brief context in which the jurors might more 
knowledgeably answer questions during voir dire. A preliminary opening statement is not required and may serve no useful 
purpose in short trials or trials with relatively simple issues. The judge should be particularly attuned to prevent argument or 
posturing at this early stage of the trial. 
Paragraph (e)(l4). The Utah Supreme Court has noted a tendency of trial court judges to rule against a challenge for cause in 
the face of legitimate questions about a juror's biases. The Supreme Court limited the following admonition to capital cases, 
but it is a sound philosophy even in trials oflesser consequence. 
[W]e take this opportunity to address an issue of growing concern to this court. We are perplexed by the trial courts' frequent 
insistence on passing jurors for cause in death penalty cases when legitimate concerns about their suitability have been raised 
during voir dire. While the abuse-of-discretion standard of review affords trial courts wide latitude in making their for-cause 
determinations, we are troubled by their tendency to "push the edge of the envelope," especially when capital voir dire panels 
are so large and the death penalty is at issue. Moreover, capital cases are extremely costly, in terms of both time and money. 
Passing questionable jurors increases the drain on the state's resources and jeopardizes an otherwise valid conviction and/ 
or sentence . ... If a party raises legitimate questions as to a potential juror's beliefs, biases, or physical ability to serve, the 
potential juror should be struck for cause, even where it would not be legally erroneous to refuse. State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 
629 (Utah 1995). 
In determining challenges for cause, the task of the judge is to find the proper balance. It is not the judge's duty to seat a jury 
from a too-small venire panel or to seat a jury as quickly as possible. Although thorough questioning of a juror to determine 
the existence, nature and extent of a bias is appropriate, it is not the judge's duty to extract the "right" answer from or to 
"rehabilitate" a juror. The judge should accept honest answers to understood questions and, based on that evidence, make the 
sometimes difficult decision to seat only those jurors the judge is convinced will act fairly and impartially. This higher duty 
demands a sufficient venire panel and sufficient voir dire. The trial court judge enjoys considerable discretion in limiting voir 
dire when there is no apparent link between a question and potential bias, but "when proposed voir dire questions go directly to 
the existence of an actual bias, that discretion disappears. The trial court must allow such inquiries." The court should ensure 
the parties have a meaningful opportunity to explore grounds for challenges for cause and to ask follow-up questions, either 
through direct questioning or questioning by the court. 
The objective of a challenge for cause is to remove from the venire panel persons who cannot act impartially in deliberating 
upon a verdict The lack of impartiality may be due to some bias for or against one of the parties; it may be due to an opinion 
about the subject matter of the action or about the action itself. The civil rules of procedure have a few-and the criminal rules 
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many more-specific circumstances, usually a relationship with a party or a circumstance of the juror, from which the bias of 
the juror is inferred. In addition to these enumerated grounds for a challenge for cause, both the civil rules and the criminal rules 
close with the following gr~unds: formulation by the juror of a state of mind that will prevent the juror from acting impartially. 
However, the rules go on to provide that no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed an opinion upon 
the matter if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the person will, notwithstanding that opinion, act impartially. 
The amendments focus on the "state of mind" clause. In determining whether a person can act impartially, the court should 
focus not only on that person's state of mind but should consider the totality of the circumstances. These circumstances might 
include the experiences, conduct, statements, opinions, or associations of the juror. Rather than determining that the juror is 
"prevented" from acting impartially, the court should determine whether the juror "is not likely to act impartially." These 
amendments conform to the directive of the Supreme Court: If there is a legitimate question about the ability of a person to act 
impartially, the court should remove that person from the panel 
There is no need to modify this determination with the statement that a juror who can set aside an opinion based on public 
journals, rumors or common notoriety and act impartially should not be struck. Having read or heard of the matter and 
even having an opinion about the matter do not meet the standard of the rule. Well-informed and involved citizens are not 
automatically to be disqualified from jury service. Sound public policy supports knowledgeable, involved citizens as jurors. The 
challenge for the court is to evaluate the impact of this extra-judicial information on the ability of the person to act impartially. 
Information and opinions about the case remain relevant to but not determinative of the question: ''Will the person be a fair 
and impartial juror?" 
In stating that no person may serve as a juror unless the judge is "convinced" the juror will act impartially, the Committee uses 
the term "convinced" advisedly. The term is not intended to suggest the application of a clear and convincing standard of proof 
in determining juror impartiality, such a high standard being contrary to the Committee's objectives. Nor is the term intended 
to undermine the long-held presumption that potential jurors who satisfy the basic requirements imposed by statutes and rules 
are qualified to serve. Rather, the term is intended to encourage the trial judge to be thorough and deliberative in evaluating 
challenges for cause. Although not an evidentiary standard at all, the term "convinced" implies a high standard for judicial 
decision-making. Review of the decision should remain limited to an abuse of discretion. 
This new standard for challenges for cause represents a balance more easily stated than achieved. These amendments encourage 
judges to exercise greater care in evaluating challenges for cause and to resolve legitimate doubts in favor of removal. This 
may mean some jurors now removed by peremptory challenge will be removed instead for cause. It may also mean the court 
will have to summon more prospective jurors for voir dire. Whether lawyers will use fewer peremptory challenges will have 
to await the judgment of experience . 
Notes of Decisions (273) 
Rules Crim. Proc., Rule 18, UT R RCRP Rule 18 
Current with amendments received through 11/15/14 
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